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CONFLICT OF LAWS: SUPREME COURT APPLIES
LAW OF TRANSFEROR FORUM TO TRANSFERS
UNDER SECTION 1404 (a)
INHERENT in the provision for transfer of a civil action from one
federal district court to another under section 1404 (a)1 is the prob-
lem of which state's laws shall govern the adjudication of the case
after transfer. Federal courts have struggled to find a solution which
would be consistent with the limited purposes of 1404 (a)2 without
contravening the Erie3 prescriptions regarding uniformity between
federal and state courts within a given state. In the recent decision
of Van Dusen v. Barrack,4 the Supreme Court of the United States
resolved the issue by holding that the law of the transferor forum
would apply.
The case arose when a commercial airliner en route from Boston
to Philadelphia crashed in Boston Harbor. More than one hun-
dred wrongful death actions were brought in a Massachusetts federal
district court, and over forty-five in a Pennsylvania federal court.
The defendants moved under 1404 (a) to transfer the latter actions
to Massachusetts, the transferee state, where most of the witnesses
allegedly resided and where all the suits could be consolidated. The
plaintiffs opposed the motion on the ground that Massachusetts was
not a forum where the action "might have been brought," in that
the plaintiffs had not qualified under Massachusetts law5 to sue in
a representative capacity as required by Federal Rule 17 (b).0 The
plaintiffs also maintained that transfer would be unduly prejudicial
because a transferee federal court would apply the limited recovery
1 "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1958).
2 1404 (a) was designed as a simple device to prevent "wastefulness of time, energy
and money" and "to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary
inconvenience and expense." Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19,
26-27 (1960).
'Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
' 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 195, § 8 (1955), requiring an administrator or executor
from a foreign state to obtain ancillary appointments in order to acquire standing to
sue in Massachusetts. The plaintiffs in Barrack had not obtained such appointments.
'The capacity of a representative to sue or be sued "shall be determined by the
law of the state in which the district court is held...." FED. R. Civ. P. 17 (b).
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provisions of the Massachusetts Death Act,7 whereas under Pennsyl-
vania choice of law rules the unrestricted Pennsylvania measure of
damages8 would be applied.9
The Pennsylvania district court ordered the transfer regardless
of which state law was applicable, and asserted that transfer was
not precluded by the plaintiffs' failure to qualify to sue under
Massachusetts law.10 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed, holding that there could be no transfer unless the plaintiffs
had an unqualified right to sue in the transferee forum (Massachu-
setts) at the time the original action was filed."
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the contention that Mas-
sachusetts was not a forum where the action "might have been
brought" as required in 1404 (a). The Court held that this phrase
refers only to federal venue and jurisdictional requirements, and
does not comprehend state laws regarding the capacity to sue.12 Al-
though Massachusetts was a forum in which the action "might have
been brought," the Court noted that transfer would neverthe-
less be contrary to the "interest of justice," and hence precluded
by 1404 (a), if the transferee court would dismiss the action for lack
of standing under Massachusetts law. Therefore, the Court deemed
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 229, § 2C (1955), limiting recovery to damages not in excess
of $20,000. The provision is regarded as punitive rather than compensatory and
assesses damages according to the degree of culpability. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 128 (1956). The section has since been amended, raising the maximum
recovery to $30,000, effective as of January 1, 1963. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2
(Supp. 1963).
8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1601-04 (1953). Pennsylvania's standard of damages is
compensatory, measuring damages by pecuniary injury. See Spangler v. Helm's New
York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959).
OThe defendants had argued that Pennsylvania would follow the lex loci conflict
of laws principle and apply the law of the jurisdiction where the tort was committed,
Reply Brief for Petitioners, pp. 2-3. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended
that Pennsylvania courts would be more likely to follow two recent New York cases
which held that the damage features of the Massachusetts Death Act were incom-
patible with New York public policy and thus not applicable. 376 U.S. at 628-29.
Compare Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 556-57 (2d Cir. 1962);
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
Subsequent to the decision in Barrack, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved
the issue in a related context by holding that Pennsylvania damage provisions would
apply in a wrongful death action by a Pennsylvania citizen on a tort committed in
Colorado, where Colorado had no real interest in application of its more restrictive
damage provisions. Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1964).
10 Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd sub nom.
Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
""Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1962).
12 376 U.S. at 621-24.
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it essential to decide which state law would apply after a 1404 (a)
transfer.13
The Supreme Court had a choice of several solutions. It might
have followed the ad hoc approach employed by some district courts
of granting transfer only upon certain stipulated conditions. 14 This
would insure that neither party is unduly prejudiced by possible
variances in the laws of the two forums. However, this approach
fails to provide precise guidelines for future cases; moreover, it does
not attempt to reconcile transfer under 1404 (a) with an interpreta-
tion of the Erie formula.
Another solution might have required application of the law of
the transferee state where the action was ultimately to be tried.
Superficially, this result would appear to conform to the view that
the Eric doctrine requires uniformity of result between federal dis-
trict courts and courts of the state in which they sit.15 In
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 16 the Supreme Court had construed the
"nub of the policy that underlies Erie":
In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all
cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely be-
cause of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome
of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the
same ... as it would be if tried in a State court.... [T]he accident
of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in
a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially differ-
ent result. 1
This language could be easily interpreted to require uniformity be-
tween federal courts and courts of the state in which the action is
"I Id. at 624-26. The case was remanded to the district court in Pennsylvania for
a reconsideration of the question of "convenience" in light of the application of
Pennsylvania's laws after transfer. Id. at 646; ci. Parsons v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry,, 375
U.S. 71 (1963). The Supreme Court directed the district court to consider judicial
familiarity with the laws governing the case as a factor in determining whether the
transferor forum would be more convenient. Although not a controlling criterion
in itself, according to the Court uncertainty in a state's choice of law rules should
weigh against transfer, convenience being facilitated by determination of these close
questions by local judges more familiar with indigenous laws. 376 U.S. at 644-46.
1, E.g., Frechoux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 118 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (transfer
on condition that transferor state statute of limitations will apply); Greve v. Gibraltar
Enterprises, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 410 (D.N.M. 1949) (movant's express assurance not to
assert transferee statute of limitations constitutes waiver of that defense).
15 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
"0 326 U.S: 99 (1945).
1 Id. at 109. (Emphasis added.)
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instituted; until Barrack, no Supreme Court case interpreting Erie
had been decided within the context of a 1404 (a) transfer. Hence, it
would be preferable to adopt that interpretation of Erie which best
effectuated the purposes of the transfer device. 1404 (a) was enacted
as a provision intended only to reduce costs and facilitate the conven-
ience of trials.18 These limited purposes were not meant to sanction
its use by parties to obtain "a change of law as a bonus for a change
of venue,"' 19 thereby prejudicing one of the litigants in many cases.20
Where the transferee state's statute of limitations would bar the
action, for example, transfer would be tantamount to dismissal of
the action. Thus, the alternative adopted by the Court was the
application of the law of the forum where the suit was filed. The
Court in Barrack interpreted the Guaranty language to mean that
the "critical identity" to be maintained in 1404 (a) cases is the uni-
formity of outcome between the federal court and the state courts
of the forum where the action was filed.2'
In reaching its ultimate decision to apply the law of the trans-
feror forum, the Supreme Court relied upon two circuit court cases22
for a proper interpretation of 1404 (a).23 In one instance, the Tenth
Circuit held that transfer would be appropriate even though the
statute of limitations of the transferee forum would have precluded
the action. It saw no logical reason why the right of action conferred
by the state of filing should be completely obviated upon transfer
to the more convenient forum. 24 Therefore, the effect of the de-
cision was to permit transfer on condition that the transferee's short-
28 See note 2 supra.
219 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Justice Jackson insisted that making the place of trial the sole factor determining
the law of cases tried in federal courts would transform 1404 (a) into a forum-shopping
measure capable of causing great "conflict, confusion and injustice." lbid.
20 See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 405,
438-41 (1955). The author argues that "if it should be established as a rule of thumb
that the transferee court is to apply the law of the state in which it sits, every case
in which there is a difference of law between the original and the transferee state
would become a game of chess, with Section 1404(a) authorizing a knight's move;
and nothing would be certain except that the parties would land on a square of a
different color." Id. at 441.
2' 376 U.S. at 639. This ruling refines the holding in previous cases interpreting
Erie. See notes 15-16 supra.
2' H. L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 928 (1963); Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950).
23 376 U.S. at 631.
2 Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir. 1950). The
analysis in Headrick has been criticized for its failure to consider whether New
Mexico had a forum non conveniens rule. 60 YALE L.J. 537 (1951).
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er statute of limitations would not be asserted.25 Subsequently, the
Second Circuit extended this rationale beyond the obvious prejudice
inherent in dismissal under the transferee's statute of limitations.
It stated that rights acquired under the state law of the forum of
filing should remain unaffected, and that the transferee district
court should apply common law and choice of law rules of the trans-
feror forum. 26 The force of this language, however, was mere dic-
tum, because the case was transferred to a different circuit.y7
,As a result of Barrack, the transferee court is to apply the state
law which would have governed the action had there been no change
of venue,28. subject to the qualification that this includes only those
laws which would significantly affect the outcome of the case. 29 In
construing 1404 (a) the Supreme Court held that it is not a device
to be used by defendants to "defeat the advantages accruing to
plaintiffs who have chosen a forum which, although it was incon-
venient, was a proper venue."30 The statute is simply a mechanism
" The Tenth Circuit also noted that transfer might be totally inappropriate be-
cause the district court failed to consider factors of convenience from the plaintiff's
point of view. Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., supra note 24, at 310-11.
20 H. L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1962).
2 In Green, plaintiff was a New York corporation asserting a right to damages for
an alleged violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Transfer to Alabama was
ordered, the court asserting that federal courts in the past had been unanimous in
applying transferor statutes of limitations in analogous circumstances.
210376 U.S. at 639.
21Id. at 629 nA0. Only laws of the transferor state which significantly affect the
outcome are required to be applied by the transferee forum. Thus the transferee
court could apply its own rules "governing conduct and dispatch of cases in its
court." Ibid.
Cases subsequent to Guaranty have found the outcome test a rather difficult one
to apply. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). See
generally Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's Eye View of Federalism in Diversity
Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REV. 443 (1962). Problems may arise, for example, in determin-
ing whether a particular rule of evidence of the transferor state is a rule governing
"conduct and dispatch" of cases. Variances such as conflicting dead man statutes of
the transferee and transferor states might well be categorized as outcome-determina-
tive in a given situation. Cf. Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616 (3rd. Cir. 1946).
10 376 U.S. at 633-34. This solicitude for the plaintiff has not always been demon-
strated by the Court. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), generally
cited by the Court as the authoritative source of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens as applied by the federal courts, all the advantages accruing to the plaintiff
by suing in the inconvenient forum were defeated. The plaintiff in Gulf Oil brought
suit in New York on a Virginia tort and was dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds, leaving him no choice but to sue in Virginia and accept all its rules of law.
This result jeopardized the plaintiff's cause of action itself, for as Justice Black
pointed out in his dissent, "whether the [Virginia] statute of limitations has run
against the plaintiff, we do not know." Id. at 516-17. According to the revisor's Note
accompanying 28 U.S.C. 1404 (a), the statute was drafted as a codification of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Past history of 1404 (a), then, would indicate that
Vol. 1965: 149]
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to counteract such inconveniences, and "should be regarded as a
federal judicial housekeeping measure, dealing with the placement
of litigation in the federal courts and generally intended, on the
basis of convenience and fairness, simply to authorize a change in
courtrooms." 3 1
To buttress this conclusion, the Court adopted the aforemen-
tioned interpretation of Erie, requiring the outcome in federal
diversity cases to conform to the result which would have been
reached in the courts of the state where the action was originally
filed.32 However, the Court expressly declined to decide which state
law would be applicable in cases where state courts of the transferor
forum would have dismissed the action pursuant to forum non con-
veniens. 33 It may be argued that where a suit would have been
dismissed pursuant to forum non conveniens if commenced in a
state instead of a federal court, it is reasonable to presume that the
its language and policy could indeed justify its use by defendants to dilute the effect
of the plaintiffs venue privilege.
81376 U.S. at 636-37. (Emphasis added.)
32 See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
33 Courts in a number of states have the prerogative to dismiss actions on a
showing that a forum in another state would be a more convenient place for trial.
Fifteen jurisdictions have applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens: Price v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954); "Winsor v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 154 A.2d 561 (Del. Super. Ct. 1958); Depenbrock v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
172 A.2d 561 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1961); Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla. 747, 169 So.
391 (1936); Gonzales v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 189 Kan. 689, 371 P.2d 193 (1962);
Carter v. Netherton, 302 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957); Union City Transfer v.
Fields, 199 So. 206 (La. Ct. App. 1940); Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland
Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (1933); Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 243
Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 763 (1954); Strickland v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 194 Miss.
194, 11 So. 2d 820 (1943); Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N.H.
341, 168 Atl. 895 (1933); Quigley Co. v. Asbestos Ltd., 134 N.J. Eq. 312, 35 A.2d 432
(Ch.), aff'd, 135 N.J. Eq. 460, 39 A.2d 135 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944); Gregonis v. Phila-
delphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1923); Pruitt Tool
& Supply Co. v. Windham, 379 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1963); Forcum-Dean Co. v. Missouri
Pacific R.R., 341 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
Five states have indicated approval of the doctrine but have not as yet applied
it in an actual case: Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, Inc., 227 Ark. 839, 303
S.W.2d 578 (1957); Cotton v. Louisville & N.R.R., 14 Ill. 2d 144, 152 N.E.2d 385
(1958); Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 399 Pa. 553, 160 A.2d 549 (1960); Mooney v. Denver
& R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950); Lau v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 14
Wis. 2d 329, 111 N.W.2d 158 (1961).
Four states have indicated possible acceptance in a proper case: Bradbury v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 149 Iowa 51, 128 N.W. 1 (1910); Fellers v. Belau, 87 Ohio
Law Abs. 54, 178 N.E.2d 530 (C.P. 1961); Homer v. Pleasant Creek Mining Corp.,
165 Ore. 683, 107 P.2d 989 (1940); Morisette v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 76 Vt. 267, 56
Atl. 1102 (1904).
Factors weighed by the courts in determining whether to decline jurisdiction vary.
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947); 1964 Duca L.J. 595, 600 n.33.
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plaintiff would have refiled in a more convenient forum, resulting
in the application of that state's laws. Under the strict logic of
Erie, a 1404 (a) transfer should produce the same result-the law of
the transferee forum should be applied in such cases.
The most serious objection to such unqualified obeisance to Erie
is the "surprise, uncertainty and opportunity for maneuvering"
which it permits the parties. 4 Either party might in a given situa-
tion obtain the change of law "bonus" which the Court disapproves,
and an application of the transferee's law would permit the defen-
dant to use 1404 (a) as a forum-shopping device, thereby gaining
substantial. advantages or, in extreme cases, actual dismissal upon
transfer.3 5 Several other factors militate against such-a strict con-
struction of Erie. In most states, situations in which the law of forum
non conveniens will be invoked have not been clearly defined. 36 This
uncertainty in state law is a weighty argument against adherence
in federal courts to the outcome achieved under state forum non
conveniens rules.37 Furthermore, although state courts might dis-
miss an action on forum non conveniens grounds, occasionally they
have done so only on condition that the movant agree not to assert
certain prejudicial laws of the convenient forum when the action
is refiled.35 Other courts have simply refused to dismiss where it
would be unduly prejudicial to the plaintiff.39 The effect of such
decisions has been to preserve many of the plaintiff's advantages
gained in the original forum, a result which is consistent with the
theory of 1404 (a) as enunciated in Barrack. Where the circum-
stances of a case would dictate such qualification or denial of a forum
non conveniens dismissal in a state court, the application of trans-
feror law following a 1404 (a) transfer in fact conforms to the uni-
formity of result prescribed in Erie.
Whether Erie requires adherence to outcomes produced by
forum non conveniens at all is a question which has never been
decided.40 The application of the doctrine is a matter of discretion
which varies with the factors of convenience and considerations of
84 Currie, The Erie Doctrine and Transfer of Civil Actions, 17 F.R.D. 353, 367
(1955). See text accompanying notes 36-42 infra.
"8 E.g., Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950).
I' Currie, The Erie Doctrine and Transfer of Civil Actions, 17 F.R.D. 353, 367 (1955).T lbid.
8 E.g., Wendel v. Hoffman, 259 App. Div. 732, 29 N.E.2d 664, 18 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1940).
80 See, e.g., Thistle v. Halstead, 95 N.H. 87, 58 A.2d 503 (1948).
"0 Currie, The Erie Doctrine and Transfer of Civil Actions, 17 F.R.D. 353, 367 (1955).
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equity.41 In light of the strong policy arguments against application
of transferee state law, the uncertain and discretionary nature of
forum non conveniens should not alter the basic rule of Barrack.
Although Barrack precludes the use of 1404 (a) as a defendant's
forum-shopping measure, the Court intimated that the latitude af-
forded a plaintiff in his original choice of venue is not boundless.
It stated that transferor state law might in some unspecified situa-
tions contravene constitutional limitations. 42 For example, where the
transferor state has no real interest in the litigation, application of
its laws (including its choice of law rules) in a transferee forum
which does have such an interest might well deprive the defendant
of due process of law.43 In this instance the full faith and credit
clause should not require application of transferor state law.44
Likewise, in a situation where the plaintiff moves for a trans-
fer,45 considerations other than maintaining uniformity of result
between state and federal courts of the state of filing might dictate
application of the transferee forum's laws. Otherwise, the plaintiff
could first file an action in an available forum whose laws were
Il Parsons v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 375 U.S. 71 (1963).
42 376 U.S. at 639 n.4.
's Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Ci. L.
REv. 341, 350-51 (1960); see, e.g., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S.
66 (1954); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). But cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 216-22 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Hokanson v. Helene Curtis
Indus., 177 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Ci.
L. REv. 341 (1960).
The American Law Institute's proposed transfer statute distinguishes a defendant's
motion to transfer, under which the law of the transferor state will always continue
to apply, and a motion by a plantiff, which is to result in application of the trans-
feree's laws. A.L.I., Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal
Courts §§ 1306 (c), 1807 (b) (Tent. Draft No. 2 1964). To codify Van Dusen v. Barrack
in this way might foreclose consideration of the constitutional "disinterested forum"
question, which the Court purposely left open for future deliberation. 376 U.S. at
639 n.4. Sections 1306 (c) and 1307 (b) reduce the choice of law problem to a rather
rigid formula, unless the proviso that these rules shall apply "to the extent that
the court ordering the transfer would have been [is] obliged to apply the law of
any state" can be construed as leaving the law applicable on transfers from dis-
interested states open to constitutional challenge. A.L.I., Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts §§ 1306(c), 1307 (b) (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1964). Arguably, the resolution of this question should be left to the courts for
further clarification before such codification, to insure a more viable statute. See
Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 1963 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 790-93.
'" The great majority of cases allow a plaintiff to obtain a transfer on a proper
showing of convenience and fairness. E.g., In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir.
1954); Troy v. Poorvu, 132 F. Supp. 864 (D. Mass. 1955); Dufek v. Roux Distrib. Co.,
125 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Contra, Barnhart v. John B. Rogers Prod. Co., 86
F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
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most favorable to his case, however inconvenient it might be, and
then obtain a transfer to a more convenient forum whose laws were
perhaps less advantageous. The inequity of this result would in
most cases warrant attaching a change of law to a plaintiff-requested
transfer as a caveat against such maneuvers, subject to the objec-
tions against applying a disinterested transferee state's laws noted
above. The proposed American Law Institute Tentative Draft
statute provides for application of transferee state law whenever a
plaintiff moves for transfer.46 This rule may be too harsh and in-
flexible in situations where the transferee's statute of limitations
would bar the action, and a measure of judicial discretion in such
cases appears more desirable than a rigid statutory formulation.47
With these qualifications, the solution adopted by the Court is
well-reasoned and equitable. Although the plaintiff is allowed to
choose the applicable state law within the jurisdictional and venue
limitations of federal statutes,48 the defendant may nevertheless ob-
tain transfer on a proper showing of convenience and fairness, which
is all the statute was intended to facilitate. Barrack preserves the
efficacy of 1404 (a) as a simple change of venue device by its utiliza-
tion of the requirement that the transfer be in the interest of justice
to preclude undesirable jockeying by the parties for a more favor-
able state law.
,0A.L.I., Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts §
1307 (b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964).
,7 See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 754, 793-
94 (1963).
"28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1406 (1958).
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